Albertans’ Perception Problem: How Misjudging Public Opinion Shapes Our Politics

Evan Walker

TL;DR

Perceptions of public opinion shape politics and policy-making in Alberta, but these perceptions often diverge from reality. Many Albertans overestimate the province's conservatism and underestimate support for progressive policies like Safe Consumption Sites or green energy. This "political perception gap" distorts views on contentious issues like separatism, anger toward Ottawa, and support for an Alberta Pension Plan. Factors like media consumption and cognitive biases—false consensus, pluralistic ignorance, and social conformity—amplify these misperceptions. The results are troubling: false polarization, divisive politics, and policy decisions misaligned with public sentiment. Addressing these gaps is crucial for fostering understanding and productive dialogue in Alberta's polarized political landscape.

The Disconnect Between Self and Others

Alberta has long been labeled Canada’s most conservative province, but that reputation doesn’t entirely hold up. Many Albertans describe themselves as moderates. Yet when asked to place the “average” Albertan on the political spectrum, most picture their peers as far more conservative than they actually are (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Self Ideological Placement vs. the “Average” Albertan

This perception gap shapes how Albertans view key political issues. Two good examples are Safe Consumption Sites (SCS) and a transition to green energy: nearly half of Albertans support these initiatives, but they believe that support is much lower—hovering around 20–30% (Figure 2). On the flip side, only 22% of Albertans support the idea of an Alberta Pension Plan (APP), yet perceived support for the APP is estimated to be closer to 30%. These distortions are consistent: Albertans overestimate how right-leaning the province is and, in turn, also underestimate support for progressive policies (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Political Perception Gaps, Perceived VS Actual Public Support Select Issues

Why Are We So Wrong About Each Other?

In earlier research, our team has explored what might be causing these skewed public opinion perceptions. Albertans might be just plain bad at guessing, but in our case, large portions of individuals consistently wrong in the same direction warranted further investigation. Results are what you might expect.

First, people who primarily consume social media or right-wing news outlets are more likely to overestimate Alberta’s conservatism. Secondly, those who follow mainstream news or have lived in Alberta longer tend to have a more accurate sense of public opinion.¹

Still, it is difficult to say what exact psychological mechanism is causing these distortions. At least three can reasonably be expected to have some influence:

1. the false consensus effect, which leads people to assume their views are widely shared;

2. pluralistic ignorance, which happens when people mistakenly think their beliefs are in the minority, even when they’re not, and

3. social conformity, where individuals’ judgements or attitudes are shaped by their surroundings (or perceived surroundings).

Add in social media algorithms that amplify extreme or controversial opinions, and it’s easy to see how perceptions get warped.

What are the Consequences of Public Opinion Bias?

Social scientists in the United States have been particularly attentive to how prevalent these judgment errors are and how they shape politics. For instance, many Republicans who dispute the outcome of the 2020 election tend to believe that only a tiny majority actually supports the election outcome and believes in upholding electoral norms.²

Similar social perception errors can be tied to decreased life satisfaction, xenophobia, protest, and greater support for radical parties.³ Likewise, climate change deniers are prone to vastly overestimating the proportion of the population that also rejects climate change; similarly, gun owners grossly underestimate support for gun violence protection policies—even among their fellow gun owners.⁴

How Do Albertans Fare?

Our Common Ground team has been polling Albertans on their support of various public policy issues since 2019. Through our Viewpoint Alberta suverys, we also asked Albertans about their perception of public support across proposed policies that have been polarizing in recent years, such as the Alberta Sovereignty Act or Safe Consumption Sites.

This allows us to measure the differences between “actual” and “perceived” support across several issues. We call this the “political perception gap.”

Figure 3 shows a tendency to underestimate left-wing policy support, and slightly overestimate right-wing policy support across the public.

Figure 3. Distribution of Perception Gaps in Alberta

We can use these variables to explore how this misperception of public opinion is associated with three different political outcomes:

1. Whether or not individuals feel that the number of Albertans angry about Ottawa’s treatment of Alberta is increasing/decreasing.

2. Whether or not individuals feel that Alberta separatism is extremely likely or certain to happen.

3. Whether or not individuals feel that public support for Alberta leaving the CPP is increasing or decreasing.

To test these scenarios, we fit a series of logistic regressions alongside a battery of control variables (Appendix A). Findings are as follows.

"Well, I think we are all getting much angrier about how Ottawa treats us!”

Those who estimate Alberta as more conservative are also more likely to say that Albertans are growing increasingly angry with Ottawa. The opposite is true for those who view Alberta as more left-wing; those who believe Alberta houses a more progressive political culture are much less likely to think that Albertans have gotten angrier over time (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Angry Albertans Predicted Probabilities

“It’s just a matter of time, Alberta can go it alone!”

But what about how the likelihood of separatism? Separating from the rest of Canada is a high bar to clear. Not only would it require a referendum expressing that a “clear majority” of Albertans want to separate in the eyes of the House of Commons, but if such a vote were to occur, the terms of separation would be negotiated between Alberta and the rest of Canada. All this before even considering any Treaty obligations or disputes.

Despite this, it is reasonable to expect that if an individual thinks the majority of the province is overwhelmingly right-wing, then separatism could be all the more likely. An imagined right-wing consensus could make musings of a successful vote seem probable or even inevitable.

We find evidence consistent with this logic. Those who vastly overestimate how conservative the province is are more likely to state that separatism is at least very likely or a certainty. For those topping the scale, the predicted probability of stating Alberta separatism is very likely is ~70%. Again, the opposite relationship holds for those who overestimate how progressive Albertans are. For these folks the predicted probability of stating that separatism is very likely to happen is roughly a meagre 10% (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Predicted Probabilities Separatism Likelihood

“Surely more folks are starting to see the benefits of an Alberta Pension Plan?”

The last outcome that can be examined is whether or not respondents perceive public support for the Alberta Pension Plan (APP) is growing. The results for this question differ from the previous two outcomes explored. As expected, overestimating how conservative public opinion correlated with an increased likelihood of saying that public support for the APP is growing. However, while in the expected direction, the left-wing error term did not return any meaningful results.

Figure 6 highlights this relationship. Once an individual overestimates public support of right-wing policies by over 25%, the probability of saying that the public is growing more supportive of the APP exceeds 50%, rapidly increases, and eventually levels out at over 90%. On the right-hand side of Figure 6, the opposite is the case. The expected relationship with the left-wing error term is negative and downward-sloping, but we cannot say if the observed correlation is significantly different from zero.

Figure 6. Predicted Probabilities Growing Support for APP

Implications

Literature examining cognitive biases and public opinion stresses that judgement errors often metastasize into other areas of social events, distorting how we perceive others, the likelihood of events, and the favourability of policies. The findings presented here suggest that this phenomenon is alive and well in Alberta. Regardless of the direction of the relationship outlined above, we can see that some Albertans occupy separate political realities.

Those who perceive Alberta’s political climate as more conservative are more likely to say that the province is growing angrier, that separatism is not just likely but expected, and that momentum is building across the public for an APP. On the other hand, those who think that Alberta is exceedingly progressive feel the opposite.

The perception of these outcomes can be quite disconnected from the results documented in our own public opinion polling. Regarding separatist support and the percentage of Albertans angry with how the province is being treated in Confederation, the Common Ground team at the University of Alberta has tracked public sentiment on these issues for five years.

Contrary to how some may feel, support for separatism and the proportion of Albertans who are "angry" with Alberta’s position in Confederation is actually much lower than five years ago (Figure 7). In the latter case, the percentage of the population angry at Alberta's treatment at the hands of Ottawa has decreased by ten percentage points since 2019 (Figure 7). That being said, it would be unfair to suggest that a significant portion of Albertans are not angry with how the province is being treated. Our numbers find that ~40%, on average, state they are angry about Alberta’s position and future in Confederation (Figure 7). Perhaps our reputation as Canada’s angriest province lives on, even if the trend has been typically a downward one over the last 5 years.

Similarly, support for separatism has fallen from ~30% to ~18% since 2019. This makes the prospects of a successful referendum on separating from Canada an increasingly unlikely prospect, regardless of how individuals feel. Unfortunately, we don't have sufficient data for a longstanding time series on support for an APP quite yet, but, referring back to Figure 1 and earlier research, actual support across all Albertans is ~24%; in other words, it is quite unpopular.

Figure 7. Proportion of Angry Albertans and Separatist Support Over Time

Note: Survey waves conducted twice a year, with the exception of 2019, 2020, and 2022. I.e. Wave 1 = 2019 and Wave 9 = Fall 2024

In the long-term, these findings could spell trouble for polarization and policy-making in Alberta.

When people believe their political opponents hold extreme or abnormal views (when in reality they do not), it fuels division and makes compromise harder—a phenomenon referred to as false polarization. If individuals couple this prejudice with a belief that they are in the majority, it will likely only amplify out partisan hostility. This will make finding compromise and productive dialogue between progressives and conservatives difficult.

In the policy-making sphere, evidence suggests that political elites are prone to similar cognitive biases when estimating public opinion. In brief, politicians like to believe that their constituents feel as they do—after all, they were elected by them. If politicians systematically misinterpret what their constituents want, proposed policy changes may rapidly diverge from the public appetite.

Nevertheless, the above findings demonstrate that deviations in how Albertans perceive their political climate correlates with other distortions of their political environment. On the whole, this points to a polity increasingly disconnected from one another. In such an environment, finding common ground will be increasingly challenging.

Appendix A: Logistic Regression Models (Odds)

1. Wesley, Jared, Hannah Diner, and Evan Walker. 2024. "Polarization in Alberta." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Prairie Political Science Association, Banff, Alberta. September 20.

2. Weinschenk, Aaron C., Costas Panagopoulos, and Sander van der Linden. 2021. “Democratic Norms, Social Projection, and False Consensus in the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election.” Journal of Political Marketing 20 (3–4): 255–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2021.1939568.

3. Goffe N., Monusova G. (2019). Misperception of Social Realities: Political Implications. Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 63(8), pp.91-101 DOI: 10.20542/0131-2227-2019-63-8-91-101.

4. Leviston, Z., I. Walker, and S. Morwinski. 2013. “Your opinion on climate change might not be as common as you think.” Nature Climate Change 3(1): 334-337. https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate1743; Grene, Kathleen L., Amani S. Dharani, and Michael B. Siegel. 2023. “Gun violence prevention policy: Perceived and actual levels of gun owner support.” Preventative Medicine Reports 35. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10387604/.